In the context of a property co-ownership dispute, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal rejected a claim that beneficiaries in a unit trust, which trust held land equally as between one pair of beneficiaries and another, themselves held an ‘interest in land’ for the purposes of standing to seek an order forcing its sale.

In Patel v Sengun Investment Holdings Pty Ltd [2023] VSCA 238, the Victorian Court of Appeal has held that a document styled as a ‘Heads of Agreement’ for the sale of land was capable of specific performance as a binding contract. This was in circumstances where the Court accepted the document’s characterisation as a contract not for the purchase of the subject property but for a ‘call option’ for its potential later purchase.

The Victorian Supreme Court has recently clarified an area of law otherwise ‘not highly defined or clearly stated’: the equitable doctrine of ‘marshalling by apportionment’. In the case of Callisi Pty Ltd v Sterling & Freeman Advisory Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 300, M Osborne J addressed competing arguments regarding the application of the rule of equity capable of impacting the ability of a first-ranking secured interest-holder to realise its security across multiple assets.

In a case where a purchaser sought to terminate a contract for the sale of land and recover a deposit paid, the Court of Appeal in Willis v Crosland [2021] VSCA 320 has construed what it means to be ‘in default’ under a particular type of standard form contract. The Court also has set out clearly the interaction between two key doctrines of contract law: repudiation and termination for breach. These are principles of relevance not only to conveyancing matters but also to contractual disputes generally.

Harris v Harris [2021] VSCA 138 involved a claim of proprietary estoppel arising from a series of promises made by a father to bestow land on his sons. The issues on appeal focused on whether the trial judge’s decision to declare a promisee’s entitlement to inherit the land was disproportionate in satisfying the requirements of conscientious conduct. In answering that question, the Court of Appeal identified and applied a number of key principles guiding the award of remedies for proprietary estoppel.

A landlord seeking to regain possession of retail premises where a tenant has breached the terms of the lease is required to follow certain steps in first giving notice to the tenant. Landlords should give proper notice not only in the interests of fairness to a tenant but also in order to avoid regaining possession of premises unlawfully. The recent decision in CB Buffett (Burwood) Pty Ltd v Delloyd Pty Ltd (Building and Property) [2020] VCAT 1234 involved an application for relief against forfeiture and illustrates the importance of a landlord giving proper notice to a tenant. The decision also demonstrates that a notice which specifies multiple defaults cannot be struck down as invalid simply because the landlord fails to substantiate some of those defaults.

A cooling off period can be a saving grace to a purchaser of residential property who no longer wishes to proceed with the transaction. Issues can arise where a purchaser exercises a right to cancel the purchase during the cooling off period but then decides instead to proceed with the purchase. Does the contract survive? What happens to any deposit which has been paid? The Supreme Court has addressed such a situation in the case of Stewart v White [2020] VSC 116.

A person seeking to regain possession of property can apply to a court for summary relief in circumstances where they have an interest in property which is being occupied without their licence or consent. The situation can become complicated, however, where the person in possession of the property and against whom the summary proceeding is brought claims an equitable interest in the property pursuant to a trust. In the case of Lu v Yu [2019] VSC 499, the Supreme Court recently considered such a circumstance and made some important comments about the interaction between trust law and possessory rights.

In the context of contracts for the sale of land, it is quite common to see clauses permitting the purchaser to nominate a third party to which title is to be transferred. Less common (one would hope) are issues arising from this, such as whether a right to nominate has been validly exercised and whether the contract of sale ultimately has been novated. Such issues recently arose for the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s resolution in Fu Tian Fortune Pty Ltd v Park Cho Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 282.

Where a party seeks to rely on another’s repudiation of a contract as a basis for suing, that party must show it has been ready, willing and able to comply with the contract. Matters can be complicated where the parties clearly disagree about how to interpret and comply with the contract, and even more so where the contract expressly requires the parties to use their best endeavours to see the contract fulfilled. The Court of Appeal in its recent decision in Bisognin v Hera Project Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 93 has tackled these kinds of issues.

A caveator of land, when notified by the Registrar of Titles of the pending registration of an interest or transfer of the land, can seek a court order that such registration be delayed for a period of time. But what if the caveat itself is defective and cannot be fixed? The Supreme Court in TL Rentals Pty Ltd v Youth on Call Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 105 has recently clarified the law regarding the ability of the caveator to instead seek an injunction in such circumstances.

Where seeking to recover land on the basis of a constructive trust arising from proprietary estoppel, when does that constructive trust arise? Does it arise when a court makes a declaration to its effect, or when the relevant cause of action accrues? And should the court consider a lesser remedy instead of declaring a trust? The Court of Appeal in McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352 answers those questions.