Parties to commercial contracts enjoy — and are burdened by — the implied duty that they cooperate in carrying out their respective ends of the bargain so that they each can have the benefit of the contract. The situation can become complicated where the contract expressly contains a mechanism for one party to seek the other’s consent to a particular course of action. Where the contract states that consent must not unreasonably be withheld, is there a binding promise not to unreasonably withhold consent? And how does the implied duty to cooperate interact with the concept of ‘reasonableness’? The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia recently considered such issues.

Fiduciary duties can arise in a multitude of relationships. An issue can arise as to whether, in light of the terms of their bargain, parties in a contractual arrangement owe fiduciary duties to one another including in circumstances where the contract relates to a joint venture. The Queensland Court of Appeal has ruled on such a case and has set out some useful points to consider when determining whether a given contractual relationship involves a fiduciary relationship.

Practitioners may be aware of the ‘rule in Jones v Dunkel’ and the way this can impact the decision to call witnesses at trial. Practitioners might not be aware, however, of the intricacies of the rule and the way it ought be applied. A recent decision of the Supreme Court provides a useful caption of the rule and its relevant principles.

Among the more common forms of relief sought in civil litigation are claims for payment of debt and claims for damages. While these are distinct remedies with their own elements, they are at times liable to be conflated or confused. The decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Yang v Finder Earth Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 22 illustrates how both the pleading of a cause of action and the framing of the relief sought can affect a party’s procedural rights. The decision serves as a reminder of the importance of clear and thoughtful pleading when formulating claims.

Where the owner of goods gives possession to a bailee and the bailee then wrongfully pledges the goods to a third party, is that third party liable to the owner for conversion of the goods? Will mere possession and control of the goods suffice to establish conversion, or is something more required? The Court of Appeal in Sell Your Gold Pty Ltd v Australian Diamond Trading Corporation Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 355 considered those questions and, in doing so, raised concerns about the lack of clarity in the law and the pressing need for legislative reform.

The rules of most Victorian courts permit a party, in certain circumstances, to obtain discovery of material prior to commencing proceedings. This is especially vital in assisting a party to ascertain who, or by what cause of action, it can sue. Like many rule-based tests, there can be some confusion about the requirements, as well as the discretionary factors, for obtaining preliminary discovery. The Supreme Court in a recent appeal decision in Alex Fraser Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2018] VSC 391 has shed some light.

Legal professional privilege provides vital protection to communications passing between lawyer and client. It is no surprise, then, that the issue of waiver of privilege is often hotly contested. In a recent decision, the Victorian Court of Appeal considered whether the way a party had pleaded its case had resulted in an implied waiver of privilege. The Court’s decision provides a useful analysis of the law relating to waiver and the potential circumstances in which a pleading can give things away.

Where a party seeks to rely on another’s repudiation of a contract as a basis for suing, that party must show it has been ready, willing and able to comply with the contract. Matters can be complicated where the parties clearly disagree about how to interpret and comply with the contract, and even more so where the contract expressly requires the parties to use their best endeavours to see the contract fulfilled. The Court of Appeal in its recent decision in Bisognin v Hera Project Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 93 has tackled these kinds of issues.

Where there has been a breach of contract, in what circumstances can the innocent party sue for damages for distress, anxiety and depression arising from the breach? What about the inconvenience caused by the breach? The Court of Appeal in the recent case of Archibald v Powlett [2017] VSCA 259 sheds some light on these issues.

Where seeking to recover land on the basis of a constructive trust arising from proprietary estoppel, when does that constructive trust arise? Does it arise when a court makes a declaration to its effect, or when the relevant cause of action accrues? And should the court consider a lesser remedy instead of declaring a trust? The Court of Appeal in McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352 answers those questions.

Where there has been a breach of contract, the innocent party can sue for damages including, where relevant, damages for the lost opportunity under the contract. In Principal Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane Broncos Leagues Club Limited [2017] QCA 254, the Queensland Court of Appeal has considered a scenario where the opportunity to earn a profit under the contract was affected by various contingencies and where there might ultimately have been a loss instead. The Court has addressed the question of law, namely, whether an innocent party to a breach of contract can suffer a compensable loss even where, had the contract proceeded, that party might have lost money.

It is elementary to the law of contract that a binding contract requires an offer and acceptance of that offer by the respective parties. In the recent decision in Queensland Phosphate Pty Ltd v Korda [2017] VSCA 269, the task for the Court of Appeal was to determine whether, on the facts, such qualities existed in light of an exchange of emails. The Court’s decision serves as a reminder of the importance, when seeking to create a binding contract through informal means, of not leaving too much to guess-work.